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JUDICIAL DISCRETION IS ADVISED: THE LACK OF
DISCRETIONARY APPOINTMENTS OF COUNSEL FOR
CHILDREN IN WASHINGTON STATE DEPENDENCY
PROCEEDINGS
Marisa Forthun
INTRODUCTION
State agencies initiate dependency proceedings when a child is
alleged, often due to parental neglect or abuse, to be a dependent of the
state.1 The state must intervene “[w]hen parents do not comply with
[Child Protective Services] requirements, or when the state believes the
child is at too great a risk to remain at home even if parents were to
comply with services.”2 Dependency proceedings usually take place in
juvenile courts and involve the local state agency, the parents, and the
child.3 After the government files a petition alleging circumstances of
neglect or abuse, “[t]he court issues temporary orders regarding custody,
parental and sibling visits, and services intended to rehabilitate the
parents and address the children’s medical, educational, and emotional
needs.”4 Then, the court conducts a hearing to assess the state’s factual
allegations.5 “Depending on the parent’s compliance with the service
plan written by the agency and ordered by the court,” the child may
return home.6 However, in some cases the state will also initiate
* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2022. I would like to thank
Professor Lisa Kelly for her supervision, guidance, and support, and Ashleen O’Brien for her
dedication and hard work on our study. I am also incredibly grateful to the entire Washington Law
Review editorial staff for their contributions and assistance.
1. Erik S. Pitchal, Where Are All the Children? Increasing Youth Participation in Dependency
Proceedings, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 233, 237 (2008); see also WASH. REV. CODE
§ 13.34.030(6)(c) (2021) (noting that in Washington State, a child may also be found dependent if
he or she “[h]as no parent, guardian, or custodian capable of adequately caring for the child, such
that the child is in circumstances which constitute a danger of substantial damage to the child’s
psychological or physical development”).
2. Pitchal, supra note 1, at 237.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 238.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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termination proceedings “to permanently terminate the parent’s parental
rights . . . and enable the child to be adopted by a new family.”7
In Washington State, the statutes, case law, court rules, and local
practices that govern dependency proceedings do not protect all
participants equally—the state and parents are guaranteed the right to an
attorney,8 but not all children are statutorily guaranteed that right.9 This
essay provides a general and brief overview of dependency
proceedings10 and emphasizes the disparity in the right of representation
afforded to parents and children appearing in these proceedings. In
addition, this paper details a study that observed dependency
proceedings across Washington State.11 The study investigated whether
trial courts discretionarily appointed counsel to children on a case-bycase basis pursuant to guidance to do so by the Washington State
Supreme Court.12 It found that, even though trial judges possessed such
discretionary power, it was rarely used, and most children were not
represented by attorneys.13 Further, researchers observed that the vast
majority of children who were represented by attorneys were guaranteed
that right under existing Washington State statutes or afforded it through
local county practices.14
In 2021, the Washington State legislature passed House Bill 1219,15
which expands and statutorily guarantees attorney representation to
children in dependency proceedings who are eight years old or older.16
This new statute does not grant attorney representation to all children,
like statutes in other states already provide for, but it paves a path in that
direction.
I.

THE DIFFERENCES IN METHODS OF APPOINTMENT AND
ADVOCACY STRATEGIES OF CHILD REPRESENTATIVES

Federal and state law allow for children to receive different types of
representation in dependency proceedings, which affects the quality of

7. Id.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra section III.A.
10. See infra Part I.
11. See infra Part IV.
12. Id.
13. See infra section IV.B.
14. See infra section IV.B.2.
15. H.B. 1219, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2021).
16. Id.
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advocacy that children receive in court. For example, federal law
incentivizes states to provide representation to children in dependency
proceedings—though not necessarily by an attorney. In 1974, Congress
enacted the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA),17
which grants federal funds to states to provide protective services to
children who are abused and neglected.18 Under CAPTA, for a state to
receive funding, the state must appoint a guardian ad litem (GAL) in
dependency proceedings “in every case involving a victim of child abuse
or neglect.”19 CAPTA’s requirements “may be [satisfied by] an
attorney,” but states do not have to appoint attorneys to children to
receive federal funding.20
In setting this minimum standard, federal law allows for disparate
types of representation: GALs and attorneys do not advocate for
children’s interests in the same way and are not bound by the same
principles and practices. GALs advocate for what they believe is “in the
child’s best interests, which may or may not align with the child’s
preferences.”21 In contrast, attorneys promote and advocate for the
child’s stated interests.22 An attorney relays pertinent information from
the child to the court and advocates for their client’s position.23
Furthermore, attorneys “have a duty of confidentiality to their child
clients”24 and can inform the child of their legal rights and
responsibilities.25 Ultimately, because attorneys have a more active
relationship with children whom they represent, they provide the
children with a voice in court.26 Moreover, children who are represented
by attorneys are more likely to be adopted or reunited with their
parents27 and benefit psychologically because they are more invested in
the outcome after being heard by the court. 28
17. Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5116).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(a).
19. Id. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii) (emphasis added).
20. Id. (emphasis added).
21. Alicia LeVezu, Alone and Ignored: Children Without Advocacy in Child Abuse and Neglect
Courts, 14 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 125, 155 (2018).
22. Id.
23. LaShanda Taylor, A Lawyer for Every Child: Client-Directed Representation in Dependency
Cases, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 605, 614 (2009).
24. LeVezu, supra note 21, at 155.
25. Taylor, supra note 23, at 614–15.
26. Id. at 620.
27. Id. at 615–16.
28. Shireen Y. Husain, Note, A Voice for the Voiceless: A Child’s Right to Legal Representation
in Dependency Proceedings, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 232, 254 (2010).
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Further, attorneys can mitigate the “high risk that children will be
placed in foster care unnecessarily or will remain in the system longer
than required to ensure their safety.”29 A child’s liberty interests are
often at stake in dependency proceedings.30 Courts may opt to remove
the child from their home, and the state often controls where the child
will subsequently live.31 When intervening in a child’s living situation,
the state has substantial interests in ensuring the child’s safety from
endangerment, maintaining family integrity, and reaching an equitable
resolution.32 However, in satisfying these interests, the state may
ultimately have to place the child in multiple homes, in a group home, or
in an institutional setting such as a mental health facility.33 Children
have countervailing “interests in their own safety, health, and wellbeing.”34 Attorneys would most adequately protect these interests
because they have more active representative relationships with the
children whom they represent in dependency proceedings.35
Although attorney representation benefits the child and streamlines
the dependency court system, some have concerns about increasing the
number of attorneys who work on dependency cases. Some worry about
the increased cost.36 However, “the cost of providing an attorney would
be offset by the positive impact of effective court advocacy on behalf of
the child, mainly increased permanency.”37 Further, increased rates of
permanency, for example through adoption, reduce governmental costs
associated with the child welfare system.38 Others are concerned about
the increased workloads that attorneys would face and the number of
attorneys that would need to be properly trained in this field.39 But this
apprehension is misplaced. CAPTA already requires GALs to receive
proper training “including training in early childhood, child, and
adolescent development.”40 In enacting this provision, Congress may
29. Taylor, supra note 23, at 608.
30. Id. at 607.
31. Pitchal, supra note 1, at 247.
32. Taylor, supra note 23, at 608.
33. Pitchal, supra note 1, at 247.
34. Taylor, supra note 23, at 607.
35. See id.
36. Husain, supra note 28, at 256.
37. Taylor, supra note 23, at 616.
38. Id. It is also important to note that when a child is reunified with their parents, compared to
when a child is adopted, the cost savings to the state are even greater because parents do not receive
additional governmental support. See id. at 616 n.121.
39. Husain, supra note 28, at 257–58.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii).
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have believed that states have a financial duty to provide adequate
training to everyone who represents children in dependency proceedings.
Moreover, for attorneys to provide the best representation possible, they
must receive proper training, learn appropriate interviewing and
counseling techniques, understand childhood development, and manage
their caseloads.41 Those who argue that these standards are too onerous
ignore the vital, obligatory nature of this training and the realities of the
dependency court system.
Each state has a statute that addresses when courts must, if at all,
appoint counsel to children in dependency proceedings. As of 2019,
thirty states and Washington, D.C., had implemented statutes requiring
courts to appoint attorneys for all youth.42 Fourteen other states afforded
children a qualified right to counsel.43 These states provided children “a
lawyer under certain conditions, such as when parental rights have been
terminated or when the juvenile is over a certain age.”44 The remaining
six states permitted the court to appoint counsel, but their statutes did not
require it.45 Washington State falls in the middle. It provides a qualified
right and mandates that courts appoint counsel in three circumstances:
six months after parental rights have been terminated,46 when the child
petitions for reinstatement of parental rights,47 and when the child is in
extended foster care services.48
II.

A PARENT’S STATUTORY RIGHT TO COUNSEL IS
UNIVERSAL IN WASHINGTON STATE

In dependency proceedings, a parent’s right to counsel stands in stark
contrast to a child’s right. Federal law does not establish such rights for
parents—the United States Supreme Court allowed states to decide the
degree to which public policy required that parents have a right to
counsel.49 Under that authority, most states, including Washington State
and Washington, D.C., grant parents a universal right to counsel in

41. Taylor, supra note 23, at 620–21.
42. Kevin Lapp, A Child Litigant’s Right to Counsel, 52 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 463, 484 (2019).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 484–85.
45. Id. at 485.
46. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.212(1)(a) (2021) (amending id. § 13.34.100(6)(a) (2019)). In other
words, when the child is legally free. See id.
47. Id. § 13.34.215(3) (2018).
48. Id. § 13.34.267(6)(a) (2021).
49. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 33–34 (1981).
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dependency and termination proceedings.50
In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,51 the United States
Supreme Court addressed whether the Due Process Clause of the U.S.
Constitution “require[d] the appointment of counsel when a State
[sought] to terminate [the] parental status” of a defendant who was
indigent.52 To do so, the Court weighed three factors from Mathews v.
Eldridge53: “the private interests at stake, the government’s interest, and
the risk that the procedures used [would] lead to erroneous decisions.” 54
It considered these factors in light of “the presumption that there is no
right to appointed counsel in the absence of at least a potential
deprivation of physical liberty.”55 The Court reasoned that the
Constitution did not “require[] the appointment of counsel in every
parental termination proceeding.”56 Instead, the Court held that state trial
courts should decide “whether due process calls for the appointment of
counsel for [parents who are indigent] in termination proceedings.”57
The Court did, however, suggest that public policy “may require that
higher standards be adopted than those minimally tolerable under the
Constitution.”58
At the time of Lassiter, most states already afforded parents a right to
counsel, and more have granted parents that right since. Indeed, the
Lassiter Court noted in its opinion that thirty-three states and
Washington, D.C., already statutorily granted parents the right to
counsel in termination proceedings, and some states even did so in
dependency proceedings.59 Now, forty-five states and Washington, D.C.,
grant parents a categorical right to counsel in termination proceedings,
and five states permit courts to discretionarily appoint counsel.60 In
dependency proceedings, thirty-eight states and Washington, D.C., grant
parents a categorical right to counsel, six states provide parents with a
qualified right, and six states permit courts to discretionarily appoint
50. Status
Map,
NAT’L
COAL.
FOR
CIV.
RIGHT
http://civilrighttocounsel.org/map [https://perma.cc/MY6P-A2JH].
51. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
52. Id. at 31.
53. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
54. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
55. Id. at 31.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 32.
58. Id. at 33.
59. Id. at 34.
60. Status Map, supra note 50.

TO

COUNS.

(2021),
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counsel.61
In Washington State, parents have a statutory right to counsel during
“all stages of a proceeding in which a child is alleged to be
dependent . . . and if [deemed] indigent, to have counsel appointed for”
them.62 In In re Dependency of M.S.R.,63 the Washington State Supreme
Court reiterated that it has long recognized “that parents subject to
dependency and termination proceedings have a fundamental liberty
interest in the right to parent their children and a constitutional right to
counsel when the State seeks to terminate that right.”64 Thus, parents in
Washington State have the universal right to be represented by an
attorney in both dependency and termination proceedings.
III. A CHILD’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN WASHINGTON STATE
IS LIMITED
A.

A Child’s Right to Counsel as Prescribed by Statutes and Local
Practices

Unlike parents, Washington State does not statutorily guarantee to
children the right to counsel in dependency proceedings. Instead, a child
is statutorily guaranteed representation by a GAL.65 The court “shall”
appoint a GAL for a child “unless [it] for good cause finds the
appointment unnecessary.”66 The use of the word “shall” indicates that,
at a minimum, the court must appoint a child a GAL when it declares
that the child is dependent. However, section 13.34.100(1) of the
Revised Code of Washington also empowers courts to decline to appoint
a GAL if they find a legally substantial reason to warrant the
appointment of a GAL unnecessary.67 Alternatively, the appointment of
a GAL “may be deemed satisfied if the child is represented by an
independent attorney in the proceedings.”68 A child may also be
represented by both a GAL and an attorney.
Because at minimum Washington State guarantees representation by a

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.090(2) (2021).
174 Wash. 2d 1, 271 P.3d 234 (2012).
Id. at 13, 271 P.3d at 241.
WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.100(1) (2021).
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
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GAL,69 most children in Washington State dependency proceedings will
be represented by someone advocating for what they believe is in the
child’s best interests.70 Thus, these children are not granted a universal
right to be represented by an attorney, who would advocate for the
child’s stated interests.71 However, the GAL has a duty “[t]o inform the
child, if the child is twelve years old or older, of his or her right to
request counsel and to ask the child whether he or she wishes to have
counsel, pursuant to [section 13.34.212(2)(c) of the Revised Code of
Washington].”72 In addition, the legislature imposes the same duty upon
the Department of Children, Youth, and Families.73 The notification and
inquiry must then occur at least annually while the GAL represents the
child.74 The Department and GAL must note in the child’s service and
safety plan or report to the court “that the child was notified of the right
to request an attorney and indicate the child’s position regarding
appointment of an attorney.”75
Washington State requires that courts appoint counsel to children in
dependency proceedings in certain, limited circumstances. A child must
be appointed an attorney “in a dependency proceeding six months after
[the court has granted] a petition to terminate the parent and child
relationship . . . and when there is no remaining parent with parental
rights.”76 If a child is seeking to petition the court to reinstate previously
terminated parental rights, then the court must also appoint counsel.77
Lastly, if the youth is between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one and
is eligible for and wishes to remain in extended foster care, then the
court must appoint counsel.78 However, if a child is under the age of
eighteen and their case does not involve termination of parental rights,
the state does not statutorily guarantee them counsel.
Outside of these limited circumstances, there are instances where
judges have the discretion to appoint counsel for children. For example,
69. Id.
70. LeVezu, supra note 21, at 155.
71. Id. at 157.
72. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.105(1)(g) (2013).
73. In re Dependency of M.S.R., 174 Wash. 2d 1, 12, 271 P.3d 234, 240 (2012) (explaining that
“[i]n 2010, the legislature specifically required that children 12 years and older be informed of the
right to request counsel and be asked every year whether they wish to exercise that right”); WASH.
REV. CODE § 13.34.212(2)(c) (2021) (amending id. § 13.34.100(7)(c) (2019)).
74. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.212(2)(d) (2021) (amending id. § 13.34.100(7)(d) (2019)).
75. Id. § 13.34.212(2)(f).
76. Id. § 13.34.212(1)(a).
77. Id. § 13.34.215(3) (2018).
78. Id. § 13.34.267(6)(a) (2021).
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a court “may appoint an attorney to represent the child’s position in any
dependency action on its own initiative, or upon the request of a parent,
the child, a guardian ad litem, a caregiver, or the department.”79 This
statute authorizes, but does not require, courts to use discretion. Further,
the statute allows parties in the proceeding or other interested
individuals, such as caregivers, to request counsel for the child.
However, the legislature did not delineate the factors courts should
consider in their discretion.
Juvenile courts may further protect a child’s right to counsel in
dependency proceedings. Juvenile courts across Washington State “shall
provide a lawyer at public expense in a dependency or termination
proceeding . . . [u]pon request of a party or on the court’s own
initiative . . . for a juvenile who has no guardian ad litem and who is
financially unable to obtain a lawyer without causing substantial
hardship” to the juvenile or their family.80 If the child has already been
appointed a GAL, “the court may, but need not, appoint a lawyer for the
juvenile.”81 Thus, in dependency proceedings in Washington State, a
child must be represented by either a GAL or an attorney or both.
In addition to statewide requirements, some counties in Washington
State employ local rules and non-binding practices that automatically
appoint counsel for children once they turn twelve. For example, the
Spokane County Juvenile Court Rules provide that “[a] child over the
age of [twelve] may request the appointment of an attorney by informing
the Guardian ad Litem or by written request to Juvenile Court staff,”
who shall then “apply to the Court for an Order Assigning Lawyer for
the child.”82 In contrast, while Thurston County has Juvenile Court
Rules relating to dependency, there is no rule mandating that counsel be
appointed for children twelve years of age and up.83 Despite this, local
practices suggest that Thurston County routinely appoints counsel for
children once they become twelve years old; Spokane County also
79. Id. § 13.34.212(2)(a) (amending id. § 13.34.100(7)(a) (2019)) (emphasis added); see also id.
§ 13.34.212(2)(b)(i)(A) (allowing “[t]he child’s caregiver, or any individual, [to] refer the child to
an attorney for the purposes of filing a motion to request appointment of an attorney at public
expense” if the child does not already have an attorney, either through court appointment or by
privately retaining one).
80. WASH. JUV. CT. R. 9.2(c)(1) (2012). Unlike the Revised Code of Washington, this Rule
requires the court to appoint counsel when the child does not have a GAL.
81. Id.
82. SPOKANE CNTY. SUP. CT. LOC. JUV. CT. R. 3.4(e)(2) (2019). This provision aligns with
section 13.34.212(2)(c) of the Revised Code of Washington, but it places the burden on the child to
request counsel.
83. See THURSTON CNTY. SUP. CT. LOC. CT. R. (2019).
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follows a similar practice.84 Further, in contrast to Spokane and Thurston
Counties, Skagit County does not automatically appoint counsel for
children once they turn twelve, and Skagit County Juvenile Court Rules
do not mention dependency proceedings.85
B.

Case Law Concerning a Child’s Right to Counsel

In separate cases under the United States and Washington State
Constitutions, the Washington State Supreme Court found that, unlike
parents, children do not have a categorical right to counsel. First, in In re
Dependency of M.S.R., the Court held that a child does not have a
categorical right to counsel under the U.S. Constitution in termination
proceedings.86 In M.S.R., the trial court terminated a mother’s parental
rights over her twin boys.87 The mother argued that the trial court erred
by not appointing counsel to represent her children.88 The Washington
State Supreme Court acknowledged that state law and court rules
provided trial courts with “the discretion to decide whether to appoint
counsel to children who are the subjects of dependency or termination
proceedings.”89 The Court found Lassiter’s “discussion of the rights of
parents
facing
the
termination
of
the
parent
child
relationship . . . instructive in analyzing the rights of a child facing the
termination of the very same relationship.”90 Thus, the Court used the
Mathews factors to guide its analysis of a child’s federal due process
right to counsel in termination proceedings.91
Using the Mathews factors, the Court compared the private interests
at issue in dependency proceedings. The Court noted that a child’s
physical liberty interest is often at stake, especially because placement in
a foster home “may result in multiple changes of homes, schools, and
friends over which the child has no control,” and these changes can
cause significant harm to the child.92 The Court found that this liberty

84. Cf. LeVezu, supra note 21, at 139 n.80 (explaining how “Snohomish and King Counties have
an unwritten policy of automatically appointing an attorney for youth on their 12th birthday”). It
appears that Spokane and Thurston Counties have a similar, unwritten policy.
85. See SKAGIT CNTY. JUV. CT. R. (2020).
86. 174 Wash. 2d 1, 20–22, 271 P.3d 234, 244–45 (2012).
87. Id. at 8, 271 P.3d at 239.
88. Id. at 5, 271 P.3d at 237.
89. Id. at 11–12, 271 P.3d at 240.
90. Id. at 15, 271 P.3d at 242.
91. Id. at 14–15, 271 P.3d at 241–42.
92. See id. at 16, 271 P.3d at 243.
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interest “is very different from, but at least as great as, the parent’s.”93
The Court surmised that, unlike a parent, a child “may face the daunting
challenge of having his or her person put in the custody of the State as a
foster child, powerless and voiceless, to be forced to move from one
foster home to another.”94 As to the government’s interest, the Court
found that the state generally has a strong and compelling interest in
providing for the welfare of children and reaching a fair and just
resolution.95 Lastly, the Court punted on the issue of the risk of
erroneous deprivation, acknowledging that “whether an additional
lawyer in the proceedings would reduce the likelihood of an erroneous
decision is subject to debate and has not been established here.”96
Ultimately, the Court held “that children have at least the same due
process right to counsel as do [parents who are indigent] subject to
dependency proceedings as recognized by the United States Supreme
Court in Lassiter.”97 The Court acknowledged that “there are many
circumstances when counsel for a child would be extremely valuable”
because counsel communicates confidentially with the child and
represents their expressed desires.98 However, this case involved the
termination of parental rights.99 Even though the Court held that “the due
process right of children who are subjects of dependency or termination
proceedings to counsel is not universal,”100 it qualified that “[n]othing in
this opinion should be read to foreclose argument that a different
analysis would be appropriate during the dependecy [sic] stages.”101
Six years later in In re Dependency of E.H.,102 the Washington State
Supreme Court revisited the issue under the Washington State
Constitution in an appeal from a dependency proceeding. Specifically,
the Court again held that state due process does not require courts to
universally appoint counsel for children in dependency proceedings.103
In E.H., a six-year-old child appeared with a court-appointed special
advocate (CASA), who acted as a GAL and asked the trial court to
93. See id. at 17–18, 271 P.3d at 243.
94. See id. at 16, 271 P.3d at 242.
95. See id. at 18, 271 P.3d at 243.
96. Id. at 19, 271 P.3d at 244.
97. Id. at 20, 271 P.3d at 245.
98. Id. at 19, 271 P.3d at 244.
99. Id. at 5, 271 P.3d at 237.
100. Id. at 22, 271 P.3d at 245 (emphasis added).
101. Id. at 22 n.13, 271 P.3d at 245.
102. 191 Wash. 2d 872, 427 P.3d 587 (2018).
103. See id. at 878, 427 P.3d at 589.
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terminate the mother’s parental rights.104 During a review hearing, the
trial court denied the mother’s motion to appoint counsel for her child.105
Upon reviewing the denial under the Mathews balancing test, the
Washington State Supreme Court held that the denial was not an error.106
The Court inquired whether Washington State’s Due Process Clause
authorized section 13.34.100(7)(a) of the Revised Code of Washington,
which grants children a discretionary right to counsel.107 First, the Court
had to determine “whether a provision of the state constitution should be
interpreted independently of its corresponding federal constitutional
provision.”108 To do so, the Court, using the analytical framework from
State v. Gunwall,109 weighed “(1) the textual language; (2) differences in
the texts; (3) constitutional history; (4) preexisting state law;
(5) structural differences; and (6) matters of particular state or local
concern.”110 The Court concluded that “the Gunwall factors support
utilizing federal guidance.”111 Thus, the Court analyzed the
constitutionality of section 13.34.100(7)(a) under a Mathews balancing
test112 and conducted a very similar analysis to that presented in In re
Dependency of M.S.R.
Altogether, the Court ruled that the record did not support
appointment of counsel for E.H.113 Under the first prong of the Mathews
test, the Court did not find that E.H. had a significant private interest at
stake.114 Although the Court recognized E.H.’s interest in visiting her
siblings to be a liberty interest, the trial court did not decide E.H.’s
placement and the state did not move to terminate her mother’s parental
rights.115 The Court considered E.H.’s interest in sibling visitation to be
“of a comparatively lesser constitutional magnitude than an interest in
physical autonomy or medical or educational decisions.”116 Under the

104. Id. at 880, 427 P.3d at 590.
105. Id. at 880–81, 427 P.3d at 590.
106. Id. at 895–96, 427 P.3d at 597–98.
107. Id. at 883, 427 P.3d at 591.
108. Id. at 885, 427 P.3d at 592.
109. 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986).
110. E.H., 191 Wash. 2d at 885, 427 P.3d at 592 (quoting Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 58, 720 P.2d
at 811).
111. Id. at 887, 427 P.3d at 593.
112. Id. at 891, 427 P.3d at 595.
113. Id. at 898, 427 P.3d at 599.
114. Id. at 895, 427 P.3d at 597.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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second prong of the Mathews test, the Court determined that the risk of
erroneous deprivation was low because E.H. and E.H.’s CASA already
agreed about visitation.117 The Court acknowledged that attorney
representation may decrease the lifespan of dependency proceedings and
may increase a child’s comfort levels in a courtroom.118 However, the
Court noted that procedural due process is focused on protecting against
erroneous state actions119 and that appointment of counsel may be proper
in certain situations.120 For example, this is so when the child disputes
the facts of the dependency or when the child’s stated interests do not
accord with the GAL’s beliefs about the child’s best interest.121 On the
facts of the case, the Court ultimately concluded that the risk of
erroneous deprivation was low because “it [was] unclear what additional
decisional accuracy an attorney for E.H. would have provided the trial
court in making its decision regarding visitation.”122 Under the third
prong of the Mathews test, the Court emphasized “the government’s
interest against adopting a categorical requirement of representation”
because the state argued that such a program would be expensive and
impractical.123 Here, the Court recognized the state’s interest in
“reaching [a] permanent and safe placement for E.H.” and concluded
that “that interest was not frustrated by the appointment of counsel for
E.H.”124 Thus, the Court affirmed the trial court’s denial.125
Although the Washington State Supreme Court held that the
Washington State Constitution did not guarantee children a universal
right to counsel in dependency proceedings, the Court provided trial
courts with guidance to consider this issue on their own. The Court
outlined a non-exhaustive list of factors for trial courts to consider:
the age of the child, whether the child is in legal or physical
custody of the State, whether the child’s stated interests are
aligned with the GAL’s assessment of the child’s best interest (if
a GAL has been appointed) or with another represented party’s
desires, whether the child disputes the facts that form a basis for
the dependency determination, whether the child presents a
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 895–96, 427 P.3d at 597.
Id. at 893, 427 P.3d at 596.
Id.
Id. at 889–90, 427 P.3d at 594.
Id.
Id. at 895–96, 427 P.3d at 597.
Id. at 893, 427 P.3d at 596.
Id. at 896, 427 P.3d at 597.
Id. at 896, 427 P.3d at 598.
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complex argument against the State’s proposed action, and the
issues that are actually disputed or to be addressed in the
hearing.126
The Court urged trial courts “to sua sponte raise the issue of
representation for children at the earliest practicable time in the
proceedings”127 and “without a presumption against appointment of
counsel.”128
In re Dependency of A.E.T.H.129 is one example of a court
successfully using E.H. to guide its analysis. In that case, Division One
of the Washington Court of Appeals balanced the Mathews factors and
directed a trial court on remand to appoint an attorney to represent a
child in a dependency proceeding.130 The child was represented by a
voluntary guardian ad litem (VGAL).131 The court found that because
the child’s parents might have lost their parental rights, the child risked
losing those relationships with her biological and foster parents and
other familial relationships.132 The court also concluded that the risk of
erroneous deprivation was high because there was misconduct in the
VGAL program and on the part of the VGALs in this case133 and
because an attorney would more effectively protect the child’s legal
interests.134 Further, because the child was six years old at the time of
appeal, the court acknowledged that she might “be able to communicate
her interests to an attorney in a way that was not possible during the first
trial when she was only two years old.”135 Finally, even though the state
126. Id. at 894, 427 P.3d at 597.
127. Id. at 890, 427 P.3d at 595 (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 898, 427 P.3d at 598.
129. 9 Wash. App. 2d 502, 446 P.3d 667 (2019).
130. See id. at 507, 446 P.3d at 671.
131. Id. at 508, 446 P.3d at 671.
132. Id. at 527, 446 P.3d at 680.
133. See id. at 508–16, 446 P.3d at 671–75. The child’s first VGAL committed numerous
breaches of confidentiality because she believed the child should stay with the foster parents. Id. at
508, 446 P.3d at 671. After the first VGAL passed away, the court appointed a replacement VGAL,
who remained largely uninvolved in this case. Id. at 508–09, 446 P.3d at 671. At the termination
trial, the court found the VGAL to be dishonest and uninformed. Id. at 509, 446 P.3d at 672. Both
VGALs had facilitated a breach of confidentiality by illegally sending the biological parents’
criminal records to the foster parent’s adoption agency. Id. The child’s biological parents moved to
remove the VGAL. Id. at 510, 446 P.3d at 672. The VGAL eventually withdrew from the case. Id.
at 511, 446 P.3d at 673. Further, during later evidentiary hearings, the court discovered that the
VGALs destroyed information and ruled that they used abusive litigation tactics. Id. at 512, 446
P.3d at 673.
134. Id. at 527, 446 P.3d at 681.
135. Id.
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had an interest in reducing the costs of their proceedings, “the costs and
procedural burden of appointing an attorney to represent [the child did]
not outweigh [the child’s] interests.”136 Ultimately, the court deemed it
necessary to appoint an attorney for this child to provide guidance that
was “long overdue in a case that ha[d] languished for years in the
superior court.”137
On April 30, 2020, the Washington State Supreme Court issued an
order in response to the COVID-19 global pandemic that added to the
guidance that the Court enunciated in E.H.138 This directive ordered
juvenile courts to consider the decision’s framework and “undertake an
individualized determination at as early a time as is practicable whether
appointment of an attorney” is necessary.139
IV. THE 2020 COURT OBSERVATION STUDY: JUDICIAL
DISCRETION IS RARELY UTILIZED
To this point, this Essay has discussed the power courts have to
appoint counsel in dependency proceedings; now, it investigates whether
that power is used. First, this section briefly explains foundational
research on dependency proceedings that occurred before the
Washington State Supreme Court decided In re Dependency of E.H.
Further, this section discusses a subsequent study that primarily
observed the effects of In re Dependency of E.H. This study suggests
that although trial courts have discretion from both statutes and case law
to appoint attorneys for children in dependency proceedings, trial judges
rarely utilize this discretion.
A.

Past Research Shows that Most Children Were Not Represented by
Attorneys in Dependency Proceedings

One study on children’s representation, conducted by Alicia LeVezu
and supported by the Children and Youth Advocacy Clinic at the
University of Washington (UW) School of Law, aimed “to capture data
about what was actually happening each day in local dependency courts
by observing a wide array of dependency hearings and tracking what

136. Id. at 527–28, 446 P.3d at 681.
137. Id. at 528, 446 P.3d at 681.
138. Extended and Revised Order Re: Dependency and Termination Cases, In the Matter of
Statewide Response by Wash. State Cts. to the COVID-19 Pub. Health Emergency, No. 25700-B622 (Wash. Apr. 30, 2020).
139. Id. at 2.
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occurred” (the 2018 study).140 LeVezu published this study in June
2018—four months before In re Dependency of E.H. Thus, at that time
the Washington State Supreme Court had not instructed trial courts to
raise sua sponte the issue of appointing children counsel, but the courts
were still statutorily bound to use their discretion when considering
whether to appoint counsel.
The researchers observed 596 hearings involving 872 children across
King, Pierce, and Snohomish Counties.141 In all, 22% of children had
attorneys present, and 23% of children were not represented by an
advocate.142 For cases in which the children did not have an advocate
present, parties to the proceedings for eight children mentioned
appointing them counsel during hearings, and courts subsequently
appointed attorneys to two children.143 Overall, most children were not
represented by attorneys, and many were not represented at all. This
study shows that, despite a statutory duty to do so, courts rarely
considered whether to appoint children counsel.
B.

The 2020 Study Shows that Judges Rarely Use Their Discretion to
Appoint Counsel to Children in Dependency Proceedings

In late 2020, two students and a professor from the UW School of
Law conducted another court observation study to better understand
whether juvenile trial courts were using their discretion to appoint
counsel for children on a case-by-case basis (the 2020 study).144 The
researchers sought to identify cases in which attorneys appeared in
dependency proceedings and determine whether courts had appointed
them via statutes, case law, or local practice. Further, the researchers
sought to witness a discretionary appointment of counsel during their
observations in part because researchers observed few appointments in
the 2018 study.
The 2020 study hoped to expand on Alicia LeVezu’s data. In
particular, the 2020 study evaluated how statutes, case law—especially
In re Dependency of E.H.—and local practices impacted courts’
140. LeVezu, supra note 21, at 137–38.
141. Id. at 140. Because of confidentiality concerns it was impossible for the researchers to
discern if they observed 872 unique children or if some children were observed during multiple
hearings. Id. at 140 n.85.
142. Id. at 143.
143. Id. at 145.
144. Lisa Kelly, Ashleen O’Brien & Marisa Forthun’s Observations of Dependency Hearings, in
Skagit, Spokane, & Thurston Counties, WA (Nov. 10, 2020 to Dec. 29, 2020) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Observation Data].
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tendencies to appoint counsel for youth in dependency proceedings. The
researchers observed 169 hearings involving 244 children over seven
weeks in Skagit, Spokane, and Thurston Counties. Because of the
COVID-19 global pandemic, all hearings were observed over the video
conferencing service Zoom. This allowed the researchers to observe
hearings in counties on the western and eastern sides of Washington
State.
The researchers collected data on multiple variables in each hearing.
Specifically, the researchers recorded (1) the type of hearing; (2) the age
of the child, if determinable; (3) whether the child was present for the
hearing; (4) whether the child was legally free under
section 13.34.100(6)(a) of the Revised Code of Washington;145 (5) what
type of advocate was present on behalf of the child, if any; and
(6) whether the court or any party raised the issue of appointment of
counsel and if the court analyzed the Mathews factors.
i.

Researchers Observed a Variety of Dependency Hearings with
Different Types of Advocates Present

This section synthesizes the data collected in the 2020 study,
including the number of hearings, number of children, and type of
advocate present in Skagit, Spokane, and Thurston Counties. The
number of hearings in each county seen in Table 1 is relatively
proportionate to the size of that county’s population.146 As of July 1,
2019, Skagit County had the smallest population with 129,205 people,147
Thurston County had the next largest population with 290,536 people,148

145. At the time of the 2020 study, RCW 13.34.100(6)(a) provided, in part, that “[t]he court must
appoint an attorney for a child when there is no remaining parent with parental rights for six months
or longer prior to July 1, 2014, if the child is not already represented.” WASH. REV. CODE
§ 13.34.100(6)(a) (2019). In 2021, this section was removed from RCW 13.34.100 and added to a
new statute, RCW 13.34.212. H.B. 1219, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2021). The relevant language
has been updated to state that “[t]he court shall appoint an attorney for a child in a dependency
proceeding six months after granting a petition to terminate the parent and child relationship
pursuant to RCW 13.34.180 and when there is no remaining parent with parental rights.” WASH.
REV. CODE § 13.34.212(1)(a) (2021).
146. Skagit County also had the lowest number of hearings because observations in Skagit
County did not begin until shortly after observations in Spokane and Thurston Counties began.
147. QuickFacts: Skagit County, Washington; United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 1,
2019),
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/skagitcountywashington,US/PST045219
[https://perma.cc/2962-3FDY].
148. QuickFacts: Thurston County, Washington; United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 1,
2019),
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/thurstoncountywashington,US/PST045219
[https://perma.cc/RC7M-Z76Z].
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and Spokane County had the largest population with 522,798 people.149
The number of hearings is unequal because of the researchers’
availabilities and the disproportionate frequency of dependency hearings
in the three counties.
Table 1: Number of Hearings and Children by County
Hearings
Children
Skagit
26
30
Spokane
75
124
Thurston
68
90
TOTAL
169
244
The researchers observed a wide variety of hearings to see whether
children were represented by or appointed counsel at different rates in
the timeline of dependency proceedings.150 The most commonly
observed hearing types were review hearings (42%), motion hearings
(18%), and permanency planning hearings (14%).151
Table 2 presents the type of advocate present on behalf of the child in
dependency proceedings per county. Even though Washington State
mandates that courts appoint a GAL to every child in dependency
proceedings unless they find good cause,152 over 12% of the children
observed did not have any type of advocate present.153
Table 2: Type of Advocate Present by County
Only an
Only a
Both an
No
Attorney
GAL
Attorney
Advocate
and a GAL
Skagit
2
25
1
2
Spokane
27
85
1
11
Thurston
15
49
9
17
TOTAL
44
159
11
30
149. QuickFacts: Spokane County, Washington; United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 1,
2019),
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/spokanecountywashington,US/PST045219
[https://perma.cc/H97N-NRQ2].
150. Family law matters, hearings that involved the Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS)
process, and trials were excluded from observation. Trials, which would often span multiple days,
were excluded due to the researchers’ more limited time commitments.
151. Observation Data, supra note 144.
152. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.100(1) (2021).
153. See Table 2; Observation Data, supra note 144.
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The Findings Demonstrate that Most Children Remained
Unrepresented by an Attorney

The 2020 study took place after In re Dependency of E.H., in which
the Washington State Supreme Court urged trial courts to raise sua
sponte whether children need to be represented in dependency
proceedings;154 thus, one would expect a higher percentage of children to
appear with counsel. However, comparison of the data between the 2018
study and the 2020 study shows that the Court’s direction did not have a
significant effect on the rates of represented children. In the 2018 study,
22% of children appeared with counsel,155 and there was no change
observed in the 2020 study.156 Additionally, in the 2018 study, 23% of
children appeared without an advocate,157 and 12% of children appeared
without one in the 2020 study.158
Other findings from the 2020 study were consistent with those from
2018—children who were represented by counsel were more likely to
appear in court,159 suggesting that they felt more invested in the outcome
of the proceedings. Thirty-five percent of children who were represented
by attorneys appeared in court, compared to the 5% of children who
were not represented by attorneys but still appeared in court.160 Further,
represented children who appeared in court outnumbered those who
were not represented by an attorney. Twenty-nine children appeared in
court in Spokane and Thurston Counties.161 Of those, fourteen of them
were represented by an attorney, five of them were represented by both
an attorney and a GAL, and eight of them were represented by a GAL.162
Thus, almost 66% of children who appeared in court were accompanied
by an attorney.163
In most cases where attorneys represented children, they were likely
appointed via the existing Washington State statutory scheme or the
relevant county’s local practices—particularly those of Spokane and

154. In re Dependency of E.H., 191 Wash. 2d 872, 890, 427 P.3d 587, 595 (2018).
155. LeVezu, supra note 21, at 144.
156. See Observation Data, supra note 144.
157. LeVezu, supra note 21, at 144.
158. See Table 2; Observation Data, supra note 144.
159. LeVezu, supra note 21, at 150.
160. Observation Data, supra note 144.
161. Id. Zero children appeared in court in Skagit County.
162. Id. The remaining two children who appeared did not have an advocate present because
either appointed counsel failed to appear, or the attorney’s paralegal appeared instead.
163. Id.
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Thurston Counties. Both counties regularly appoint counsel to children
over the age of twelve. In Spokane County, of the twenty-eight children
represented by attorneys, twenty-five of them were twelve years of age
or older.164 In other words, 89% of children received counsel likely
because of local practices and statutory mandates.165 In Thurston
County, of the twenty-four children represented by attorneys, eighteen of
them were twelve years of age or older.166 This suggests that 75% of
attorneys were likely appointed through local practices and statutory
mandates.167 In Skagit County, three out of thirty children were
represented by an attorney.168 A court in the county determined that one
child was legally free, which statutorily guaranteed them counsel.169
Thus, almost all children who were represented by counsel likely had
counsel because of statutes or county practices.
A few cases suggest that courts might have exercised their
discretionary powers to appoint counsel to children. However, even in
these cases, the researchers could not ascertain how these children
acquired counsel. In Thurston County, one child was eleven years old,170
which suggests that a court may have exercised its discretion to appoint
this child an attorney. However, the controlling reason for this
appointment is unknown. Two children in Skagit County were siblings
under the age of twelve, and it was unclear why they had an attorney
present.171 Thus, because no statute mandated that they be represented,
this could have resulted from a prior discretionary appointment.
Overall, in the hearings involving the 189 children who were not
represented by an attorney, researchers did not observe a single request
made and approved for discretionary appointment of counsel. In a
Thurston County hearing, one party requested counsel for a two-year-old
child. The Assistant Attorney General who represented the state
objected, claiming that a two-year-old child could not state her interests.
The judge did not address the request further, rule on the matter, or
appoint an attorney. In a Skagit County hearing, one researcher observed

164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. After recent legislative changes, the relevant section of law is now found in
RCW 13.34.212(1)(a). WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.212(1)(a) (2021) (amending id. § 13.34.100(6)(a)
(2019)).
170. Observation Data, supra note 144.
171. Id.
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a judge grant a GAL’s request to appoint a child counsel. The child had
recently turned twelve years old and gave a noncommittal answer when
informed of his right to request counsel. This was the only appointment
of counsel observed in 169 hearings, and it was the result of the statutory
mandate that GALs inform children of their right to request counsel after
turning twelve rather than judicial discretion.172
iii.

Analysis of Hearings Demonstrates that Unrepresented Children
Could Have Benefitted from Counsel

Anecdotal examples from observed hearings demonstrate that
numerous children who did not have counsel might have benefitted from
a judicially-appointed attorney. These examples are drawn from
firsthand observations of dependency proceedings.
Two Skagit County review hearings show that children with
significant liberty interests at stake could have benefitted from an
attorney’s direction. In one hearing, key issues could not be resolved,
and the child could not return home for forty-one months. The child’s
mother was homeless, and the social worker reported concerns that the
child’s father could not read the child’s cues or respond quickly to
emergencies. While the Department of Children, Youth, and Families
asked the court to place the child with a guardian or terminate parental
rights, the father wanted the court to return his daughter to his care. The
child was represented by a GAL, but an attorney might have helped
communicate the child’s ultimate wishes and resolve the case more
quickly. In a different hearing, the court considered changing a child’s
permanency plan. The child was not represented by an advocate, which
is not in compliance with state law, unless the court previously found
good cause to not appoint a GAL.173 A change in the plan would affect
the child’s physical liberty, but the child did not have an advocate
present to voice their interests. While In re Dependency of E.H.
concerned sibling visitation,174 these hearings determined where the
child would ultimately be placed. The Washington State Supreme Court
recognized sibling visitation as a liberty interest, but this interest was “of
a comparatively lesser constitutional magnitude than an interest in
physical autonomy.”175 Here, the children’s interests to find permanent
172. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.212(2)(c) (2021).
173. Id. § 13.34.100(1) (mandating appointment of a GAL for a child in dependency
proceedings).
174. In re Dependency of E.H., 191 Wash. 2d 872, 895, 427 P.3d 587, 597 (2018).
175. Id.
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homes were strong because the former hearing concerned the
termination of parental rights and the latter was missing an advocate.
These strong interests likely outweighed the state’s interests to reduce
costs in both cases.176 Thus, courts performing a Mathews analysis
should have appointed attorneys for these children.
Similarly, a child in a Spokane County review hearing did not have an
advocate and would have benefitted from being represented. The child
did not have a GAL because all present parties acknowledged that the
court would likely terminate parental rights. However, the court did not
have “good cause”177 to refrain from appointing a GAL for the child. In
In re Dependency of A.E.T.H., the child was at risk of losing her parents
and other familial relationships.178 The court noted that children have
“the right to basic nurturing, including a stable, safe, and permanent
home”179 and appointed the child an attorney after weighing each of the
Mathews factors.180 In the Spokane County hearing, the child was at risk
of losing these relationships as well and likely would have benefitted
from an attorney, who could have protected her private liberty interests
in the hearing.
Another review hearing in Spokane County also illustrates how
attorneys can be beneficial in hearings involving siblings, especially
when they might be separated in different placements. A court had
placed three children in foster care: two children remained together, but
the court had placed the third in a separate foster home. None of the
children were placed with relatives, and the record did not explain why.
This situation is typically undesirable because youth in foster care have
well-established rights to be placed with siblings and “to live with adult
relatives as opposed to strangers.”181 An attorney could have ensured
these rights were met in this case.
A different permanency planning hearing in Spokane County
demonstrates how an attorney could safeguard against unnecessary or
numerous placement changes. At the outset, two children, ages six and
seven, lived with their grandmother. Unlike In re Dependency of E.H.,
which dealt with sibling visitation rights,182 this court addressed the
siblings’ placement. Placement changes can cause significant harm to a
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

See id. at 893, 427 P.3d at 596.
WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.100(1).
In re Dependency of A.E.T.H., 9 Wash. App. 2d 502, 527, 446 P.3d 667, 680 (2019).
Id. (citing In re Dependency of M.S.R., 174 Wash. 2d 1, 17, 271 P.3d 234, 243 (2012)).
Id.
Pitchal, supra note 1, at 255.
In re Dependency of E.H., 191 Wash. 2d 872, 895, 427 P.3d 587, 597 (2018).
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child because they have to rebuild relationships and relocate schools.183
There is also a risk that the first placement does not work out, and
children could ultimately face a series of placement changes during their
childhood.184 Here, such a risk existed because the court was considering
returning the six-year-old child to foster care because of his behavioral
issues. Furthermore, this child was the same age as the child in In re
Dependency of A.E.T.H., who was appointed an attorney because she
might “be able to communicate her interests to an attorney in a way that
was not possible” when dependency began.185 Comparably, the six-yearold child in Spokane likely deserved an attorney to whom he could have
communicated his interests. The attorney would have advocated for the
child’s wishes, whether that was to stay with his grandmother or remain
with his sibling.
Lastly, two hearings in Thurston County highlight the difference that
an attorney can make at the shelter care stage in a dependency
proceeding.186 In one hearing, the child was a teenager in foster care.
The teenager was represented by an attorney and appeared for his
hearing. His attorney articulated that he wished to be placed with his
sister and maintain communication with his father. By contrast, during a
different hearing, a mother agreed with the judge to place her two
unrepresented children into foster care. The mother did not feel like her
home was safe for her and her children, and she identified some possible
placement options, though they were outside Washington State. The
judge granted the mother visitation rights, but there remained unresolved
issues concerning the children’s eligibility under the Indian Child
Welfare Act (ICWA).187 An attorney could have helped resolve the
lingering ICWA issues and explored other placement options,
particularly those suggested by the mother. An attorney could have also
advocated for the children’s stated interests, as was successfully
demonstrated in the first shelter care hearing.

183. M.S.R., 174 Wash. 2d at 16, 271 P.3d at 243.
184. Pitchal, supra note 1, at 247.
185. A.E.T.H., 9 Wash. App. 2d at 527, 446 P.3d at 681.
186. See WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.065(1)(a) (2021) (“When a child is taken into custody, the
court shall hold a shelter care hearing within 72 hours . . . to determine whether the child can be
immediately and safely returned home while the adjudication of the dependency is pending.”).
187. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963; id. § 1903(4).
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WASHINGTON HOUSE BILL 1219 EXPANDS CHILDREN’S
REPRESENTATION

In 2021, the Washington State legislature passed House Bill 1219,
which concerned the appointment of counsel for youth in dependency
court proceedings.188 Through this bill, the legislature sought to expand
legal services afforded to youth in dependency proceedings.189 The bill
will implement a phase-in schedule for court appointment of attorneys
developed by the statewide children’s legal representation program.190
This program exists within the Office of Civil Legal Aid (OCLA).191
The bill expands section 13.34.090 of the Revised Code of
Washington by acknowledging that children have a right to counsel in
dependency proceedings. Previously, section 13.34.090 only recognized
that “the child’s parent, guardian, or legal custodian has the right to be
represented by counsel, and if [deemed] indigent, to have counsel
appointed for him or her by the court.”192 The legislature amended
section 13.34.090 to include that: “[a]t all stages of a proceeding in
which a child is alleged to be dependent, the child has the right to be
represented by counsel. Counsel shall be provided at public expense
subject to the phase-in schedule as provided in section 6 of this act.”193
Pursuant to section 6, the legislature will appropriate money for legal
services, and the statewide children’s legal representation program will
then contract with attorneys and agencies to implement the services.194
Overall, this new addition to section 13.34.090 is a step in the right
direction towards expanding children’s access to counsel in dependency
proceedings.
Further, section 6 statutorily guarantees counsel to children at
younger ages.195 It retains a child’s statutory right to counsel six months
after parental rights have been terminated.196 In addition, pursuant to the
phase-in schedule, it requires that courts appoint counsel for children
under eight years old “for the dependency and termination action upon

188. H.B. 1219, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2021).
189. Id. at 11.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 8.
192. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.090(2) (2018).
193. H.B. 1219, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Wash. 2021).
194. Id. at 12.
195. Id. at 8–12.
196. Id. at 8. This right was previously codified in section 13.34.100(6)(a) of the 2019 version of
the Revised Code of Washington.
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the filing of a termination petition.”197 Courts also retain the ability to
appoint counsel for children under eight years old “on [their] own
initiative, or upon the request of a parent, the child, a guardian ad litem,
a caregiver, or the department, prior to the filing of a termination
petition.”198 For children between the ages of eight and seventeen,
“appointment must be made upon the filing of a new dependency
petition at or before the commencement of the shelter care hearing.”199
Despite its benefits, section 6 does not universally guarantee counsel
to all children in dependency proceedings. First, this section’s
unqualified guarantee of counsel omits all children under the age of
eight. These young children are guaranteed the right to counsel if the
state seeks termination of parental rights, but they are not guaranteed the
right to counsel in dependency proceedings. In limiting the guarantee for
children under eight, the legislature likely believed that stakes are higher
in termination proceedings; however, the stakes in dependency
proceedings are often just as high because dependency proceedings
discuss placement, sibling visitation, and school changes. Thus, the
legislature could go further to guarantee the right to counsel for all
children in dependency proceedings regardless of age. This is not
unprecedented—Washington State could follow the lead of states like
Louisiana and mandate that courts appoint counsel for every child and
for the entire duration of the legal proceedings.200
Second, the phase-in schedule implements section 6’s guarantees on a
county-by-county basis over six years.201 Counties are prioritized in the
schedule if there is “[n]o current practice of appointment of attorneys for
children in dependency cases” or where there is “[s]ignificant prevalence
of racial disproportionality or disparities in the number of dependent
children compared to the general population.”202 Because the phase-in
schedule will require multiple years to implement, some children may
not reap the bill’s benefits until later in their dependency proceedings.
Nonetheless, the phase-in schedule and section 6’s new guarantees will
provide more children in Washington State the benefit of legal
representation during their dependency proceedings.
197. Id. at 10.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 11.
200. Christin Lanham, Statistically Speaking: How Can Illinois Improve Its Statutory
Requirements for Representation of Children in Dependency Proceedings?, 30 CHILD. LEGAL RTS.
J. 106, 106 (2010).
201. H.B. 1219, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2021).
202. WASH. REV. CODE § 6(3)(c)(i)(A)–(B) (2021).
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The legislature is also adding a new section to ensure that researchers
assess the impacts of legal representation on case outcomes.203 This
research is critical to document positive changes that legal representation
will have on children in dependency proceedings and to ensure that
funds are being distributed appropriately. While the new section does
not specify that researchers are to observe judicial outcomes, it would be
beneficial for independent legal researchers to conduct research,
observe, and ensure that these new laws and procedures are being
properly followed in court, like the 2020 study aimed to do.
CONCLUSION
Although juvenile court judges have the authority to appoint counsel
for children in dependency proceedings, they rarely do so. Washington
State statutes and case law direct trial courts to consider appointing
counsel for children who are unrepresented. Even in hearings where
courts consider changes in a child’s placement, separation of children
from siblings, or termination of parental rights, children may not have an
attorney or a GAL. While the existing Washington State statutory
scheme provides judges with discretion to appoint counsel in these
situations, the mechanism is futile if it is rarely used. And indeed, it is—
the court observation study in 2020 found that the majority of children
were represented by an attorney because statutes or local county
practices guaranteed them that right. Thus, the most effective way to
provide greater protection to a child’s right to counsel is to statutorily
mandate that right.
House Bill 1219 will pave the way for children to access legal
representation more readily in Washington State dependency
proceedings. While this new law statutorily mandates a right to counsel
in certain cases, other states do more. The passage of this new legislation
should address some of the disparities, inequalities, and injustices seen
in the observation study across Skagit, Spokane, and Thurston Counties.
Legal research in the future will hopefully document how greater legal
representation provides greater protection to children and leads to more
permanent outcomes.

203. Id.

